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EDITORS’ SPECIAL

Balancing Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian
Contradictions Within Organizations
ANIL NAIR
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
DAVID AHLSTROM
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, New Territories

This article describes how institutions get infused with competing logics and analyzes
how such competing logics might aid the design of contemporary organizations. It does
so by exploring the contrasting views of American founders Alexander Hamilton and
Thomas Jefferson on the issues they confronted in the years leading up to and after the
United States’ independence from the British. Their views have had a lasting influence
on the character and efficacy of the U.S. government. Although Hamilton and Jefferson
contemplated issues related to the governance of the United States, the authors argue
that their writings offer insights that can be useful to students of organizational design.
They identify four influential ideas from the writings of Hamilton and Jefferson and
discuss their implications for organizational design.
Keywords: Hamilton; Jefferson; organizations; design; institutions; U.S. history

H

inings and Greenwood (2002, p. 413)
observed that the focus of organizational theorists in business schools in the early days of
the field was “how to understand and thus design
efficient and effective organizations.” However, over
the past 2 decades, the research focus among organizational scholars appears to have shifted toward
broader, field-level issues,1 whereas teaching in business schools seems to emphasize more specific skill

sets. For instance, a quick survey of the MBA curricula at Harvard, Wharton, and Stanford reveals that
the core or required courses at these institutions tend
to focus on leadership, organizational behavior, business fundamentals, and analytical skills.2
Meanwhile, in recent years changes in environments have posed new challenges for organizations.
In many markets, because of uncertainties created by
rapid technological changes (Christensen & Raynor,
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2003) and fierce global competition, executives face
continuous pressures to enhance the adaptiveness
and efficiency of their firms. Miller (2005) argued that
under such circumstances, organizational design is
becoming increasingly critical to deriving competitive advantage.
Studies on contemporary organizational design
and forms appear to have adopted diverse perspectives (Child & McGrath, 2001). Some writers have proposed that dealing with the pressures of environmental
uncertainty and competitiveness require organizations
to develop ambidextrous capabilities (Tushman &
O’Reilly, 1996) or create a dialectical orientation
and culture (Nonaka & Toyama, 2002; Pasacle, 1990).
Such dualistic themes seem to not only offer new
insights about organizational design, but also have the
potential to explain, bridge, and integrate broader
field-level dynamics with organizational-level phenomena (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007). For example,
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) have described
how the presence of contradictory (convergent and
divergent) institutional pressures enables structural
changes within organizations. As several scholars
have observed (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Marquis &
Lounsbury, 2007; Thornton, 2002), competing logics
can offer an institutional field a richer set of mechanisms for change; we believe such logics if designed
into an organization may enhance its ability to adapt.
Here, logic is “the broad cultural beliefs and rules that
structure cognition and guide decision making in a
field” (Lounsbury, 2007, p. 289). In this article, we
explore how such logics develop and the specific
insights they may offer into the design of organizations that are simultaneously adaptive and efficient.
We do so by identifying the ideas espoused by
American founders Alexander Hamilton and Thomas
Jefferson and how they influenced the development of
competing logics within the institutions of governance
in the United States. We use this discussion to propose
a model of organizational design that is responsive
to the competing pressures facing organizations.
Drawing lessons for contemporary management from
history is not unusual; Rindova and Starbuck (1997)
studied the writings of Confucius to understand leadership, Sally (2002) reviewed the history of Rome
to draw lessons on coleadership, and Hormats (2003)
explored Abraham Lincoln’s writings to gain insights
on the development of emerging economies. Such
studies have the potential to reveal the timeless characteristics of the central principles, constructs, and challenges in the design and management of organizations.

We chose Hamilton and Jefferson for our study
because their views have had lasting influence on the
character and design of the American republic (Ellis,
2002). We identify four major ideas from their writings
that were instrumental in the building of the American
system of economy and government (Chernow, 2004).
Hamilton and Jefferson disagreed with one another on
each of these ideas, and their well-codified debates
and the resulting resolutions of these conflicts resulted
in a built-in duality within the American system of
governance. We organize these discussions around the
following constructs: balancing conflict, managing
change, distributing power, and leadership tenure.
The article is organized as follows: First, we offer a
brief history of the early days of the American republic
and the key roles played by Hamilton and Jefferson.
Then, on the basis of a thorough review of their
writings, speeches, debates, and biographies (e.g.,
Boyd, 1955; Foner, 1950; Chernow, 2004; Coates, 19951999; Ellis, 1997; Lipscomb & Bergh, 1903-1904;
Madison, Hamilton, & Jay, 1987; McCullough, 2001;
McDonald, 1982; Peterson, 1986), we identify and
organize their views on governance and organizational
design. Because of the elegance of their writings
(and speeches), we often express their views in their
own words. We conclude by noting that the four ideas
identified in the article reinforce each other and that
deriving competitive advantage today requires executives to design organizations that dynamically balance
the tensions inherent in Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian
prescriptions.
HAMILTON AND JEFFERSON
Historians have maintained that the United States
benefited greatly at its founding from the contributions of brilliant thinkers and statesmen such as
Benjamin Franklin, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas
Jefferson, James Madison, George Washington, and
John Adams (Bowen, 1986; Ellis, 2002; McCullough,
2001; Vidal, 2003). Of these, Hamilton and Jefferson
are of particular interest to us not only because of their
extensive influence on the early organization of the
United States, but because of the contrasting views
they held on many major issues of governance
(Christman, 1992; Cunningham, 2000). The differences
between the two were not just limited to their ideas,
but also extended to their backgrounds and personalities. This has produced some engaging treatment of
the two individuals in texts dealing with the history of
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the times and their biographies (e.g., Appleby, 2003;
Brodie, 1974; Chernow, 2004; Kennedy, 2000; Mapp,
1991; McDonald, 1982; Peterson, 1986; Randall, 2003).
Hamilton and Jefferson came from vastly different
backgrounds. Born to a prominent Virginia family,
Jefferson enjoyed a privileged upbringing. He studied
at the College of William & Mary and was admitted to
the Virginia bar in 1767 (Peterson, 1986). In contrast,
Hamilton was born on the British island of Nevis in
the West Indies, enduring very difficult times as a
child. Impressed by Hamilton’s talents, several
wealthy businessmen sponsored his studies at King’s
College (now Columbia University) in New York City
(Chernow, 2004). Hamilton and Jefferson were key figures in the United States’ struggle for independence
from Great Britain and the subsequent building of a
new government. Hamilton fought in the American
Revolution and ably served as an aide-de-camp to
General George Washington (Chernow, 2004).
Jefferson authored the Declaration of Independence,
served on the Continental Congress, and was the
wartime governor of Virginia (Appleby, 2003; Ellis,
2002). Later, Jefferson served as ambassador to France,
and Hamilton was closely involved in the drafting of
the Constitution to govern the new country, as well as
writing 51 of the 85 Federalist Papers that were published (the Federalist Papers provided justification
and commentary on the new Constitution). Although
not playing a direct role in the drafting of the
Constitution, Jefferson was influential through his
writings, particularly on the Constitution’s Bill of
Rights (the first 10 amendments; Appleby, 2003).
Jefferson later served as the first secretary of state
under President George Washington until 1793, and
Hamilton served as the first secretary of the treasury
until 1795; the differences between the two men were
to become pronounced during their tenure in the
Washington administration (Cunningham, 2000). After
a respite, the two rivals faced off again when Jefferson
contested the election for the presidency in 1800 against
John Adams and Aaron Burr. Hamilton worked hard to
defeat Jefferson. When the presidential electors met to
vote for the president and vice president, Jefferson and
Aaron Burr ended up in a tie. At this point, the hotly
contested election was thrown to the U.S. House of
Representatives. Interestingly, at this latter stage of the
election, Hamilton threw his support to Jefferson,
whom he disliked less than Burr. Finally, Jefferson won
the election and Burr was given the vice presidency.3
Hamilton left for New York, where he would later be
killed in a duel with Aaron Burr in 1804 (Chernow,

2004). Meanwhile, serving as the third U.S. president,
Jefferson continued to build the foundations of what
came to be called the “American system” of economics
and governance, which was also heavily influenced by
Hamilton’s work (Ellis, 2002; Simon, 2002).

BALANCING CONTRADICTIONS
Balancing Conflict: Order Versus Dissent
The sharpest contrast between Hamilton and
Jefferson can be seen in their view of the level of conflict to be tolerated in the emerging nation. Jefferson
abhorred monarchy and, having witnessed the
French revolution, was particularly interested in
developing a government that was more tolerant of
dissent and considered conflict as crucial to effective
governance and innovation (Peterson, 1986;
Sunstein, 2005). When Daniel Shays, a captain during
the Revolutionary War, led a poor farmers’ rebellion
in Massachusetts, Hamilton was in favor of suppressing it by force. The Shays rebellion had such an
impact on Hamilton that he referred to it in several of
his writings. In Federalist Paper No. 21, he wrote,
Usurpation may rear its crest in each [U.S.] State, and
trample upon the liberties of the people; while the
national government could legally do nothing more
than behold its encroachments with indignation and
regret. A successful faction may erect a tyranny on
the ruins of order and law, while no succor could
constitutionally be afforded by the Union to the
friends and supporters of the government. The tempestuous situation, from which Massachusetts has
scarcely emerged, evinces that dangers of this kind
are not merely speculative. Who can determine what
might have been the issue of her late convulsions, if
the mal-contents had been headed by a Caesar or by
a Cromwell? (Syrett, 1962, pp. 387-398)

Disagreeing with Hamilton on this, Jefferson wrote in
a 1787 letter to James Madison:
The late [Shays] rebellion in Massachusetts has given
more alarm than I think it should have done.
Calculate that one rebellion in 13 states in the course
of 11 years, is but one for each state in a century and
a half. No country should be so long without one.
Nor will any degree of power in the hands of government prevent insurrections. France with all its’
despotism, and two or three hundred thousand men
always in arms has had three insurrections in the
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three years I have been here in every one of which
great numbers were engaged than in Massachusetts
and a great deal more blood was split. In Turkey,
which Montesquieu supposes more despotic, insurrections are the events of every day. In England,
where the hand of power is lighter than here, but
heavier than with us they happen every half dozen
years. (Boyd, 1955, p. 442)

Jefferson’s views about dissent and revolutionary
change are also evident from his famous “tree of liberty” letter:
What country can preserve its liberties if their rulers
are not warned from time to time that their people
preserve the spirit of resistance? . . . The tree of liberty
must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of
patriots and tyrants. (Jefferson to William Stephens
Smith, November 13, 1787, in Boyd,1955, p. 356)

Yet, Hamilton feared such revolutionary change and
believed a strong central government was necessary
to prevent serious upheaval. In Federalist Paper No.
25 (referring to the Shays rebellion), he wrote,
How little the rights of a feeble government are likely
to be respected, even by its own constituents. (Syrett,
1962, p. 427)

Jefferson believed that one way to encourage dissent
within the country was to ensure protections to its
citizens from an overreaching and all-powerful central government. Jefferson was in Paris when the U.S.
Constitution was written, and after reading it he
wrote to one of its key authors in 1787, fellow
Virginian James Madison,
I do not like . . . the omission of a bill of rights providing clearly and without the aid of sophisms for
freedom of religion, freedom of the press, protection
against standing armies, restriction against monopolies, the eternal and unremitting force of the habeas
corpus laws, and trials by jury in all matters of fact
triable by the laws of the land and not by the law of
nations. (Boyd, 1955, p. 440)

A few years later when President John Adams pursued the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts to discourage aggressive criticism against the government,
Jefferson worked actively—while serving as the vice
president to Adams—with James Madison for its
annulment.4 They also teamed up to secretly write

protests against the acts in the Virginia and Kentucky
state assemblies, leading to the well-known and controversial Kentucky and Virginia resolutions, arguing
for increased rights of individuals. Jefferson firmly
believed that offering individuals the right to protest
strongly against the government and the right of revolution was vital to the survival of the republican
form of government. Jefferson’s ideas were influential
in amendments that offered constitutional protection
to dissent through the Bill of Rights. The United States
chose to protect the expression of dissent that has permitted fierce debates about the governance of United
States. Such debates generate and become the basis of
checks and balances on government; furthermore,
such debates ensure that a governing body does not
become insular and all powerful (Bowen, 1986;
Sunstein, 2005). Hamilton feared that endless pedantic debate over the minutiae of organizing would produce a governance process that would analyze but
not decide (Chernow, 2004).
On the basis of this discussion, we infer that a
Hamiltonian organization would seek to maintain
order; meanwhile, a Jeffersonian organization would
develop a culture that encourages dissent. Dissent
could be a source of conflict—a situation in which
one entity perceives that another entity may prevent
it from achieving its objectives because of differences
(Vecchio, 2003). Research on group processes has
shown that conflicts may be essential to the development of a rich menu of choices for decision making
(Andrews, 1971; Janis, 1982; Surowiecki, 2004).
Ideally, conflicts become the basis for finding
answers to ambiguous questions and initiating significant strategic change (Amason, 1996; Sunstein,
2005). Too little conflict may breed conformance (that
facilitates efficiency), but could generate an unwillingness to accept ideas that challenge the dominant
worldview within the organization. Often such insularity may create blind spots that render an organization vulnerable to changes in its environment (Zajac
& Bazerman, 1991) and problems associated with
groupthink (Janis, 1982). Yet, too much conflict can
render an organization ineffective, as debates about
choices are never settled and implementation is delayed
by disagreement over priorities and resource allocation (Goleman, McKee, & Boyatzis, 2002).
Should managers pursue a Hamiltonian path and
suppress dissent to maintain order and efficiency, or
adopt a Jeffersonian approach that encourages conflict? Given the competing demands of efficiency and
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adaptability, structure, and malleability placed on
contemporary organizations, clearly neither approach
by itself would serve managers well. Thus, managers
should maintain a balance between order and conflict
within their organization. As firms face upheaval and
potentially disruptive change in their environments
and need to become more adaptive, executives
should encourage experimentation and dissent
(Hamel, 2002; Janis, 1982). However, as the adaptation
occurs, executives would have to reassert order to
ensure that efficiencies are not sacrificed. That is,
there is no single magic balance point between order
and conflict—rather, executives would have to
achieve a dynamic balance (Pascale, 1990) in which
they purposefully use dissent while being able to conclude discussion and execute any new plans.
Dissent and conflict can be viewed at the individual, structural, and cultural level. An organization can
engender conflict within it by hiring individuals who
are willing to openly express their opinions. To do so,
executives would have to avoid tendencies to hire
and promote cronies or individuals who offer
unquestioned loyal support (Jackson, Brett, Sessa, &
Cooper, 1991). P&G’s CEO Jager found that the organization’s conformist, risk-averse, intensely loyal, and
disciplined managers were making the firm vulnerable to nimble competitors. As he tried to turn the firm
around and make it more innovative, he said, “Great
ideas come from conflict” and “I’d like an organization where there are rebels” (as cited in Bartlett, 2004,
p. 5). Conflict can also be developed at the structural
level. This can be achieved through forums in which
employees are encouraged to openly express their
views on organizational issues. For instance, at GE
Jack Welch initiated forums in which middle managers had to listen to the suggestions that employees
had about improvements at their workplace (Greiner,
2002). Firms may offer whistle-blower protection to
ensure that employees feel free to speak out without
fear of retribution. Finally, and perhaps more important, upper level managers should create a culture of
openness and tolerance of conflict by setting examples for others (Detert & Edmondson, 2007). At 3M,
for example, CEO DeSimone would tell the story of
the team that continued working on an insulated
clothing project despite management’s attempt to
stop it; the project eventually led to the launch of 3M’s
successful Thinsulate brand of insulation (Stewart,
1996). The telling of such stories within an organization communicates its culture of tolerance for dissent.

Balancing Change: Radical–Proactive
Versus Incremental–Reactive
The mission statement of an organization describes
its purpose and domain of operation (David, 2003).
Mission statements could be considered partially
analogous to the Constitution of a country. Both
express the central rationale for an institution’s existence and serve to guide executive decision making.
For insights on organizational change, we examine
how Jefferson and Hamilton viewed the interpretation of U.S. Constitution.
Hamilton and Jefferson disagreed on how the new
Constitution ought to be interpreted. Jefferson
wanted to organize a constituent assembly meeting
every 20 years or so to write a new Constitution, consistent with his views on revolutionary change (Vidal,
2003). Jefferson was in favor of proactive transformation to ensure that the government was appropriate to
the living generation. His famous observation, “The
earth belongs in usufruct to the living,” suggests that
he realized that the government should reflect the
times. He wrote to Samuel Kercheval on July 12, 1816,
We might as well require a man to wear still the coat
which fitted him when a boy as civilized society to
remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous
ancestors. (Foner, 1950, p. 750)

Jefferson’s idea of revising the Constitution every 20
years is also reflected in the following observation to
Samuel Kercheval:
Let us provide in our constitution for its revision at
stated periods. What these periods should be nature
herself indicates. By the European tables of mortality,
of the adults living at any one moment of time, a majority will be dead in about nineteen years. At the end of
that period, then, a new majority is come into place; or,
in other words, a new generation. Each generation is as
independent as the one preceding, as that was of all
which had gone before. It has then, like them, a right to
choose for itself the form of government it believes
most promotive of its own happiness; consequently, to
accommodate to the circumstances in which it finds
itself that received from its predecessors; and it is for
the peace and good of mankind that a solemn opportunity of doing this every nineteen or twenty years
should be provided by the constitution; so that it may
be handed on, with periodical repairs, from generation
to generation, to the end of time, if anything human
can so long endure. (Foner, 1950, p. 751)
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Jefferson’s friend Madison found the idea of periodic revision of the Constitution disturbing and
made the case against it in Federalist Paper No. 49,
which Hamilton claimed reflected his views as well
(Chernow, 2004). Madison pointed out that it would
be impossible to have a viable republic if the laws
were changed so frequently.
Federalist Paper No. 49 notes Jefferson’s proposition as
that whenever any two of the three branches of government shall concur in opinion, each by the voices
of two thirds of their whole number, that a convention is necessary for altering the constitution, or
CORRECTING BREACHES OF IT [sic], a convention
shall be called for the purpose. (Rakove, 1999, p. 286)

Madison then adds in Federalist Paper No. 49,
There is certainly great force in this reasoning, and it
must be allowed to prove that a constitutional road
to the decision of the people ought to be marked out
and kept open, for certain great and extraordinary
occasions. But there appear to be insuperable objections against the proposed recurrence to the people,
as a provision in all cases for keeping the several
departments of power within their constitutional
limits. (Rakove, 1999, p. 287)

The relevant objection was noted as follows:
In the next place, it may be considered as an objection
inherent in the principle, that as every appeal to the
people would carry an implication of some defect in
the government, frequent appeals would, in a great
measure, deprive the government of that veneration
which time bestows on every thing, and without
which perhaps the wisest and freest governments
would not possess the requisite stability. (Rakove,
1999, p. 287)

Another difference between Hamilton and Jefferson
about the approach to change became apparent when
Hamilton proposed the creation of a national bank
along the lines of the Bank of England. As the bill to
charter the Bank of United States passed the House of
Representatives, President Washington had sought
advice concerning the bank’s constitutionality from
Jefferson and Attorney General Edmund Randolph.
Jefferson argued that the Constitution must be
rigidly interpreted. In response, Hamilton argued the
doctrine of implied powers—a loose construction of
the Constitution—supported the establishment of a

national bank to help the central government manage budgets, the currency, and other monetary matters. Jefferson demurred:
I consider the foundation of the Constitution as laid
on this ground that “all powers not delegated to the
U.S. by the Constitutions, not prohibited by it to the
states, are reserved to the states or to the people”
[XIIth. Amendmt.]. To take a single step beyond the
boundaries this specially drawn around the power of
Congress, is to take possession of a boundless field of
power, no longer susceptible of any definition.
(Foner, 1950, p. 311)

In response, Hamilton wrote in February 23, 1791,
In entering upon the argument it ought to be
premised, that the objections of the Secretary of State
and Attorney General are founded on a general
denial of the authority of the United State to erect
corporations. The real denial of the authority of the
United States to erect corporations. The latter indeed
expressly admits, that if there be any thing in the bill
which is not warranted by the constitutions, it is the
clause of the incorporations.
Now it appears to the Secretary of the Treasury,
that this general principle is inherent in the very definition of Government and essential to every step of
the process to be made by that of the United States;
namely—by power vested in a Government is in its
nature sovereign, and include by force of the terms, a
right to employ all the means requisite, and fairly
applicable to the attainment of the ends of such
power and which are not precluded by restrictions &
exceptions specified in the constitutions; or not
immoral, or not contrary to the essential ends of
political society. (Syrett, 1965, pp. 97-98)
It is not denied, that there are implied, as well as
express powers, and that the former are as effectually
delegated as the later. And for the sake of accuracy it
shall be mentioned, that there is another class of
powers, which may be properly denominated resulting powers. (Syrett, 1965, p. 100)

Hamilton’s letter persuaded President Washington,
and he supported the establishment of the Bank of
United States, which played a role in creating a
national currency and a stabilized monetary policy.
Jefferson and Madison opposed the idea of any
national bank; the First Bank of the United States’
charter expired in 1811, during Madison’s presidency.5
On the basis of these writings, we believe Jefferson
favored changes that were radical and proactive, but
was afraid of incremental or creeping changes as these
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may lead to a gradual expansion of government’s
powers. In contrast, Hamilton’s faith in the central
government was so strong that he was willing to
accept a loose interpretation (of the Constitution);
however, he was uneasy with radical changes.
In the United States, constitutional scholars, justices, and leaders have constantly grappled with the
contradictory views offered by Jefferson and Hamilton
in their interpretation of the Constitution (Amar, 2005;
Simon, 2002). Governance in the United States has followed the Hamilton recommendation of incremental
change through amendments to the Constitution,
instead of the Jeffersonian notion of periodic preemptive change by completely rewriting it through a new
Constitutional Convention or other means. However,
as a legacy of the Jeffersonian view on strict interpretation, the amendment process itself is so complex that
it cannot be engaged in casually. As correctly foreseen
by Hamilton (and Madison), the relative permanence
of the Constitution has offered the United States stable
governance, yet the amendment process has allowed it
to adapt to the changing environment.
In a Hamiltonian organization, the core mission
would be considered a rough blueprint that is used to
guide managerial actions. In contrast, a Jeffersonian
organization would periodically question the very
fundamental reason for its existence and its mission.
The Jeffersonian view appears to be partially consistent with Eisenhardt and Brown’s (1998) proposition
that in an uncertain world, firms cannot wait to react
to circumstances, but should control their environment by engaging in time pacing. Time pacing
involves a firm strategy of introducing change at
regular intervals. Such proactive change may not be
easy⎯organizational theorists argue that change is
often (and sometimes only) driven by crises (e.g.,
Barnett & Pratt, 2000). Managers may therefore have
to develop a sense of crisis within the organization to
provoke proactive change (Dumaine, 1993). At Intel,
former chairman Andrew Grove (1999) created such a
sense of crisis by advocating the view that only the
paranoid would survive the turbulence in the technology sector.
Present-day businesses face environments that
require a balance between Hamiltonian and
Jeffersonian approaches to their mission. Although
some firms, such as GE, have managed to renew themselves by reinterpreting their mission, such renewal
includes the risk of mission creep (Einhorn, 2001). That
is, incremental departures include the risk that the
firm may be left with no clear identity in the market,

and be stuck in the middle (Porter, 1980) with capabilities that are not able to support the evolving mission.
Thus, firms should depart from their mission, but only
after careful deliberation—executives should eschew
drift. In addition to incremental changes, executives
should also periodically revisit their mission statement and question the need for a radical departure.
For example, at Intel a reevaluation of its mission led
to its exit from the dynamic random access memory
chip market (Burgelman, 1994). Punctuated changes in
some environments might make it impossible for
firms to adapt by incremental changes alone.
Balancing Power: Centralization
Versus Decentralization
In the early years of American independence, a
fierce debate raged among the leaders about the level
of centralization that would be appropriate for the
United States. Hamilton’s view on the distribution of
power is evident from his speech at the Constitutional
Convention in Philadelphia. On June 18, 1787,
Hamilton spoke on the floor to reject the Virginia and
New Jersey Plans that proposed significant decentralization (Bowen, 1986). Hamilton argued for a more
powerful central government than the one suggested
by the Virginia Plan. Hamilton’s views were recorded
by James Madison and Robert Yates. It is clear from
reading their notes that Hamilton did not trust the
“masses” to consider the best interests of the new
country:
All communities divide themselves into the few and
the many. The first are the rich and well born, the
other the mass of the people. The voice of the people
has been said to be the voice of God; and however
generally this maxim has been quoted and believed,
it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and
changing; they seldom judge or determine right.
Give therefore to the first class a distinct, permanent
share in the government. They will check the
unsteadiness of the second, and as they cannot
receive any advantage by a change, they therefore
will maintain good government. (Syrett, 1962, p. 200)

Hamilton further argued that it would be impossible for individual states to defend themselves effectively from external attacks, which proved a chillingly
accurate prediction when the still-decentralized country faced serious British attacks in the War of 1812.
Hamilton further feared that decentralization would
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create challenges in equitable contribution to the
national effort and expenses. He added that decentralization would allow individual states to cheat or
shirk responsibility because of the ability to hide
behind the group and the perceived delinquency on
the part of others and that state leaders would be
more interested in their own well-being than in the
national interest (Chernow, 2004).
Historians suggest that Jefferson more or less liked
the level of decentralization initially offered in the
Constitution that was adopted. Jefferson was in Paris
when the Philadelphia convention convened; his
views are evident from a letter he wrote to compatriot James Madison on December 20, 1787. As we
noted earlier, Jefferson’s main concern was the
absence of a Bill of Rights to prevent the consolidation of power among a few. Jefferson repeatedly
returned to the theme of distribution of power and
decentralization. As he wrote in 1821,
It is not by the consolidation or concentration of
powers, but by their distribution that good government is effected. Were not this great country already
divided into States, that division must be made that
each might do for itself what concerns itself directly
and what it can so much better do than a distant
authority. Every state again is divided into counties,
each to take care of what lies within its local bounds;
each county again into townships or wards, to manage minute details; and every ward into farms, to be
governed each by its individual proprietor. . . . It is by
this partition of cares descending in gradation from
general to particular that the mass of human affairs
may be best managed for the good and prosperity of
all. (Jefferson, 1986)

The United States has sought to balance the competing
prescriptions for centralization and localization
offered by Hamilton and Jefferson, respectively. This
built-in duality has served to simultaneously increase
the efficiency and responsiveness of U.S. governance.
Limited decentralization through a federal system
(state and local governance) has increased the country’s ability to adapt to changing needs, as states have
been able to experiment with novel solutions—for
example, on school education, social welfare, and
health care—and centralization has allowed for unity
of purpose and achieved goals that required a national
commitment and scale such as national defense.
A perennial challenge for managers, especially in
diversified firms, involves the level of centralization or
decentralization to be designed into the organization

(Daft, 2005; Duncan, 1979). It is clear from the above
writings that Hamiltonian organizations would be
centralized, whereas Jeffersonian organizations would
be highly decentralized. Studies have shown that
centralization (or decentralization) may affect an organization’s performance, employee morale, and adaptability (Chandler, 1962; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967;
Worthy, 1950). Past studies on contingency theory
have suggested that each of these structures may be
appropriate for a particular environment and strategy
(Burns & Stalker, 1961; Chandler, 1962; Lawrence &
Lorsch, 1967). However, because of the dual pressures
of uncertainty and competitiveness facing contemporary organizations, it is increasingly evident that firms
are unable to use any single structure alone. These
organizations, like governance in the United States,
may seek the benefits of centralization and decentralization—efficiency and responsiveness—by maintaining competing structures within them. Firms may do
so by first identifying critical areas that can be completely delegated to various levels of managers, functions, or subsidiaries. This would allow the firm to
create an internal ecology within which requisite variations and selection processes could occur. Winners
from within these distributed ecologies could be transferred to other parts of the organization. Jack Welch
used to assert that GE’s greatest advantage was based
on testing new management recipes and then transferring successful ones from one division to another
(Halawi, McCarthy, & Aronson, 2006). Next, executives may identify areas, such as corporate or business
strategy, for which decision-making authority is limited to upper management. This would ensure that the
decentralization does not lead to chaos and subunits
working at cross purposes. For example, during the
1980s too much decentralization led to destructive
competition at Apple between the Macintosh division
and the Apple II division such that the company had
little choice but to restructure and ease the charismatic
but mercurial founder Steve Jobs out of the company
(Carlton, 1997).6 Finally, executives may identify areas
for which decision making is shared across various
levels, functions, and subsidiaries. These shared areas
of decision making would act as a catalyst to bring the
various levels of the organization together. At 3M,
increased competition compelled CEO Lehr to create a
three-tiered structure for research. Divisions were
reorganized under sectors. At the central level, research
and development focused on long-term basic research
(Mitsch, 1992). At the sector level, research labs focused
on technologies that would have a medium-term
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payoff. Meanwhile, the division labs continued to
work on technologies with an immediate impact
(Bartlett & Mohammed, 1995). However, to ensure
sharing of technologies, which Lehr believed was the
root of 3M’s innovativeness, he developed structured
forums that brought together researchers from different divisions on a periodic basis (Angle, Manz, & Van
de Ven, 1985).
Balancing Leadership Tenure
Managerial tenure is a critical issue within organization governance. Shorter tenure may prevent managers from being fully effective as they have yet to
learn the intricacies of running the business. In contrast, longer tenure may foster managerial overconfidence, bias, risk aversion, and inertia, attributes that
are particularly troublesome during faster environmental change. The relevance of this issue was illustrated by Miller and Shamsie (2001), who found that
Hollywood executives’ tenure was associated with
their performance.
Interestingly, Hamilton and Jefferson also considered the issue of tenure. From a letter Jefferson wrote
to Madison, it is clear that Jefferson favored frequent
job rotation. Jefferson wrote,
The second feature I dislike is the abandonment in
every instance of the necessity of rotation in office,
and most particularly in the case of the President.
Experience concurs with reason in concluding that
the first magistrate will always be re-elected if the
constitution permits it. (Boyd, 1955, p. 440)

In contrast, it appears that Hamilton would have
been happier with longer tenures. For instance, during his speech in the Constitutional Convention,
according to Yates’s notes, Hamilton said,
Congress being annually elected and subject to recall
will ever always comeback with the prejudices of the
state than the good of the union. (Syrett, 1962, p. 199)

Later he added,
Can a democratic assembly, who annually revolve in
the mass of the people, be supposed steadily to pursue the public good? Nothing but a permanent body
can check the imprudence of democracy. Their turbulent and non-controlling disposition requires checks.
(Syrett, 1962, p. 200)

Jefferson and others who were very apprehensive
about the United States reverting to a monarchy worried that Hamilton wished to introduce a Britishstyle monarchy in the United States, a charge that
was probably overstated (Ellis, 2002). Hamilton, in
Federalist Paper No. 69, wrote about defending the
continuation of presidency and differentiating it from
monarchy as follows:
That magistrate is to be elected for FOUR years; and
is to be re-eligible as often as the people of the United
States shall think him worthy of their confidence. In
these circumstances there is a total dissimilitude
between HIM and a king of Great Britain, who is an
HEREDITARY monarch, possessing the crown as a
patrimony descendible to his heirs forever; but there
is a close analogy between HIM and a governor of
New York, who is elected for THREE years, and is
re-eligible without limitation or intermission. If we
consider how much less time would be requisite for
establishing a dangerous influence in a single State,
than for establishing a like influence throughout the
United States, we must conclude that a duration of
FOUR years for the Chief Magistrate of the Union is
a degree of permanency far less to be dreaded in that
office, than a duration of THREE years for a corresponding office in a single State. (Syrett, 1962, p. 591)

Eventually, the 22nd Amendment, passed after
Franklin Roosevelt’s long presidency, imposed a twoterm (or 10-year) limit on the position of the president. Although members elected to both houses of
Congress do not face any term limits, the elections
themselves are staggered, making it difficult for one
party to dominate government for too long. Thus, the
U.S. government has sought to achieve a balance
between continuity and change.
On the basis of this discussion, we infer that
Jeffersonian organizations would favor job rotation to
prevent managers from becoming complacent or abusing their power. In contrast, Hamiltonian organizations
would prefer to offer managers longer tenure to exploit
their expertise. To avoid getting locked in inertia that
constrains flexibility and yet develop the expertise
needed to achieve efficiency, organizations may follow
the U.S. model and develop a top management team
with diverse tenure and background (Surowiecki,
2004). This may be achieved through staggered tenure
of board members, complementing new CEOs with
experienced boards and support staff. For example, the
sudden death of Texas Instruments’ chairman and
CEO Mr. Junkins in 1996 led to the appointment of
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Distribution of Authority

Tenure: Diversity of
management team
Develop teams with mix of
short and long tenure
o
Members with shorter
tenure create
willingness to
change
o
Longer tenured managers
bring stability

Identify areas to be completely delegated to
subsidiaries or lower levels
o
Creates distributed ecologies; short
term focus
Identify areas that are essential to be
centralized
o
Creates order; long-term focus
Identify areas where authority is shared
o
Creates opportunities for sharing

Change
Create clear mission, strategies, and goals for
firm
Explicate mechanism for changes in mission
o
Create mechanisms to ensure
changes are well debated within
organization; avoid m ission creep
Conduct periodic reviews to examine if firm
needs incremental or radical change in mission

Tolerance of Conflict
Hire individuals willing to
question status quo
o
Avoid tendencies
to hire like-minded
individuals
Develop systems for upward
feedback
o
Policies for
protection of
whistle-blowers
Develop culture of dissent

Figure 1: Elements of an Efficient and Adaptive Organization

Mr. Engibous as a successor (before he had been
mentored for the position). To ease the transition, Texas
Instruments split off Mr. Junkins’s post of chairman
and gave it to James R. Adams, a board member
(Blumenthal & Lee, 1996). Mr. Engibous’s success at
Texas Instruments was possible because of the availability of a seasoned board to complement him.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The above discussion examined the positions of
Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson on various issues that confronted the United States at its
founding. Their views have left a significant imprint
on the design of governance within the United States
and on the efficiency and adaptability of the U.S.
government. Although their thoughts were addressed
to the governance of a nation, yet involved constructs

such as tolerance of conflict, centralization, change,
and executive tenure, we argue that they are meaningful to those interested in the design of contemporary organizations.
Although some scholars with a contingency theory
orientation (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Lawrence &
Lorsch, 1967) may debate that Hamiltonian organizations appear suitable for a stable environment and
Jeffersonian organizations are more likely to fit with a
dynamic environment, we believe the unique
strength in the design of American governance is the
intrinsic duality set up in its institutions by its two
visionary founders Hamilton and Jefferson. Likewise,
managers may cultivate and balance⎯like a see-saw
(Hedberg, Nystrom, & Starbuck, 1976)⎯contradictions within their own organizations.
Figure 1 summarizes these contradictions. We
believe the four elements support each other in creating an adaptive and efficient organization. For
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instance, balancing centralization and decentralization within an organization may support the development of a balance between order and tolerance of
conflict, as delegating authority would enhance the
likelihood of dissent within organization. Similarly,
balancing diversity of tenure may support the development of balance in managing change, as it is conceivable that those with longer tenure would support
incremental change and those with shorter tenure
would support a radical proactive change. That is,
although the contradictions within the elements itself
are important, they work together in creating an organizational form that is dynamic and self-correcting.
Our discussion and analysis adds to the emerging
literature on ambidexterity, contradictions, and
change (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Lounsbury, 2007;
Seo & Creed, 2002; Smith & Tushman, 2005) and suggests that designing organizations that embody competing logics would enhance their ability to meet
diverse pressures and manage change. This is
because, more broadly, malleability of an institutional
environment increases as it is infused with intrinsic
contradictions, thereby permitting entrepreneurs and
actors to enact change. This occurs because even as an
institutional order gains dominance, the contradictions lurk in the shadows and become the source of
variation that allows actors and entrepreneurs to conceptualize alternatives; moreover, the presence of the
alternative infrastructures offers pathways that make
transitions more fluid. In contrast, in an institutional
environment dominated by a singular logic, the stranglehold makes alternatives less likely to be evident to
actors, and unlikely to be proposed or embraced
without disruption. Furthermore, the presence of
competing logics (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007) would
also allow self-corrective processes to be set in motion
if and when actors exert excessive pressures in one
direction. That is, in such settings, the elasticity of the
institutional environment allows it to revert to a balance. For instance, in U.S. governance, if needed, an
actor could centralize power in the executive at the
federal level; however, in due course competing pressures would seek to correct the imbalance. In contrast,
in a system with singular dominant institutional
logic, say a highly centralized system, moving to a
decentralized system would be more disruptive; furthermore, unless care is taken to preserve the logic of
centralization, the possibility of rectifying excessive
decentralization without disruption becomes moot.
Of course, we realize that we have neither
asked nor answered all the possible questions about

contradictions or design. For example, what are the
costs of maintaining contradictions, and how do
institutions and organizations dilute the dysfunctional effects of contradictions? What endogenous or
exogenous factors influence the location of the tipping point (Gladwell, 2000) beyond which contradictions disappear? We hope additional research into
sources of contradictions, their costs and benefits,
their preservation, and their decline (or increase)
would offer new insights into institutional dynamics
and organizational design.

NOTES
1. This is based on a search for organization design and
institutional theory in the citations and abstracts of Academy
of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review,
Administrative Science Quarterly, and Organization Science
published up to December 2007.
2. Core and required courses were obtained from current university Web sites. Course content assessment was
based on the description in the course catalog.
3. This election led to the passage of the 12th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which ended the
practice of the candidate with the second highest number
of votes being awarded the vice presidency.
4. Thomas Jefferson held them all to be unconstitutional
and as president worked for their repeal. All of the laws
under the Alien and Sedition Acts were repealed or expired
by 1802 except for the Alien Enemies Act, which is still part
of U.S. law in 2007.
5. Ironically enough, President Madison’s government
had great difficulty financing the War of 1812 (and even
prosecuting it) without some centralized financing mechanism such as the National Bank, and after the war, Madison
became a proponent of a central bank. The Second National
Bank was chartered in 1816 and is considered a forerunner
of the current Federal Reserve system in the United States.
7. Jobs was to return to Apple in 1997 to lead its celebrated resurgence.
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